Nomeação para Suprema Corte norte-americana: propostas para o sistema brasileiro

Antônio César Bochenek; André Wasilewski Duszczak

doi:10.19135/revista.consinter.00017.26

Authors

Antônio César Bochenek Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6173-9368
André Wasilewski Duszczak Universidade Federal do Paraná https://orcid.org/0009-0004-2978-9970

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.19135/revista.consinter.00017.26

Keywords:

Process of appointing Justices, Brazilian Supreme Court, US Supreme Court, Court-Packing, Limited term

Abstract

The present work makes a comparative analysis of the system of appointing Justices to the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Supreme Court, due to the similarities they have and the similar criticisms they currently receive for allowing an imbalance and excessive politicization in appointments. Through a deductive method, a survey of studies and legislation, proposals prepared by professors from renowned North American Universities and the final report of the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States formed by an executive order issued by the President of the United States were analyzed with the aim of seeking suggestions for improving of the nomination process. Focusing on these elements, a hypothesis is presented of a limited term of office that maintains the current prerogatives of the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court, as well as the role of the Executive and Legislative branches in the appointment process, in addition ensuring greater balance and less politicization in the nomination made by the Executive branch.

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Author Biographies

Antônio César Bochenek, Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa

Doutor pela Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. Diretor do Ibrajus. Professor do Programa do Mestrado Profisional em Direito da Enfam, 70200-003, Brasília, DF, Brasil. Professor da Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa, 84010-330, Ponta Grossa, PR, Brasil. Professor da Escola da Magistratura Federal do Paraná. Juiz Federal. E-mail: cesarbochenek@uepg.br. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6173-9368

André Wasilewski Duszczak, Universidade Federal do Paraná

Doutorando em Direito do Estado pela Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR), 80020-300, Curitiba, PR, Brasil. Mestre em Direito pela PUC/PR. Mestre em Direito Comparado pela Cumberland School of Law, EUA. Foi pesquisador visitante em Stanford, EUA e Harvard, EUA. Professor da Escola da Magistratura Federal do Paraná. Juiz Federal. E-mail: andre1@ufpr.br. https://orcid.org/0009-0004-2978-9970

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